abstract: Using data on every teacher in New York State public elementary schools from 1994-95 through [2001][2002], this paper examines the response of teachers to the implementation of state-mandated testing. We ask whether the introduction of testing in the fourth grade has increased the turnover of fourth-grade teachers; whether testing differentially affected the decisions of teachers with particular attributes; and whether the characteristics of teachers entering the 4th grade changed with the introduction of testing. We find, surprisingly, that the turnover rate of fourth-grade teachers decreased relative to teachers in other elementary grades since testing began. In addition, entering fourth-grade teachers are less likely to be inexperienced teachers than those moving into other elementary school grades.
I. Introduction
Assessment-based accountability systems, long employed in the private sector, are increasingly utilized to manage large public organizations, such as health care and K-12 education. These applications are noteworthy as they attempt to substitute incentives for a long history of oversight and regulation. Yet we know little about how the actors in such systems respond. Do these systems produce unintended consequences that mitigate program goals? As an example of one such unintended consequence, it is often suggested that student assessmentbased accountability systems will induce good teachers to avoid teaching situations where the pressure that accompanies the scrutiny and sanctions is greatest, e.g., teaching in tested grades in low-performing schools. If this were to occur, it would add to a long list of job characteristics that make it less likely that the best teachers will teach in the schools where their talents are needed most. 1 In what follows, we explore this question employing data for New York State public schools.
State-mandated testing has become the norm in public elementary and secondary schools across the nation. In many states, test results are used as a measure of the effectiveness of districts, schools, and teachers; and sanctions are tied to low performance. Indeed there is some evidence that test based accountability systems may result in higher student achievement (see for example, Jacob (forthcoming), Carnoy and Loeb (2002) , and Hanushek and Raymond (2005) ).
States are strengthening these provisions to meet the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).
NCLB requires that all children be tested in English and math in grades 3 through 8; that the results of these tests be made public in report cards that are widely disseminated; that states set annual performance goals for schools, based on the percentage of students scoring proficient on state reading and math assessments; and that subgroups of students by race, income and other groupings, show consistent progress until, within 12 years, all students demonstrate proficiency in reading and math. Provisions for adequate yearly progress (AYP) have already begun to place substantial pressure on school administrators and teachers. The pressure is likely to increase as large numbers of schools fail to meet the targets. In response to these pressures, there is evidence that administrators and teachers manipulate testing situations to demonstrate improvement in student performance (see, for example, Jacob (forthcoming), Figlio and Getzler (2002) and Cullen and Reback (2002) ).
1 See Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff (2002) for a description of the sorting of teachers.
Clearly there are reasons that teachers may be dissatisfied with the recent changes.
Interview and survey research suggests that teachers feel pressure to deliver high student test scores (Barksdale-Ladd & Thomas, 2000; Hoffman, Assaf, & Paris, 2001 ). In addition, many teachers indicate that they view the high-stakes tests as an imposition on their professional autonomy, an invasion into their classrooms, a message that the state views them as incompetent, and a hindrance to professional creativity (Luna & Turner, 2001) . As districts and schools put more emphasis on test performance, teachers may not have as much flexibility in their classrooms. They may face pressures to teach topics that that they are less interested in or believe are less important for students or they may need to teach in ways that increase test-scores but not other important skills. Teachers also may have more day-to-day distractions as parents and administrators scrutinize the details of their classrooms. Moreover, teachers may worry about the security of their jobs, particularly if they teach in schools with low-performing students, which are more likely to encounter repercussions from the state. Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor, and Aliaga (2004) , for example, find that North Carolina's accountability system makes it more difficult for low-performing schools to retain teachers.
Yet, the increased emphasis on accountability and rewards may benefit teachers, as well. Standards-based reforms can provide opportunities for schools to focus on student learning. While this was sure to have been the case in many schools prior to the recent reforms, there were other, poorly functioning, schools preoccupied in other ways. Administrators may use accountability policies as leverage with the district to get rid of ineffective or distracting teachers and may simply focus more on trying to create a school that benefits students. Teachers may prefer to teach in these environments rather than in environments that do not recognize success in the classroom. In addition, as result of the pressures on schools, administrators may encourage their best teachers to move into the grades where testing is mandatory, in hopes of raising their schools' scores. One way to encourage such reassignment of teachers, for example, would be to target additional resources to the testing grades. If this were the case, we may see high-quality teachers moving into grades that most directly impact student scores on the standardized tests.
Thus, it is unclear, a priori, how the recent reforms will affect teachers. They may dissuade potential teachers from entering the classroom or may increase the probability that teachers will quit. These effects may be greatest in low-performing schools that already have difficulty attracting and retaining well-qualified teachers. However, the effects may work in the exact opposite direction, if testing and accountability have made teaching more satisfying especially in schools that had been mismanaged prior to reform.
This paper proceeds as follows: section II describes assessment-based accountability in New York; section III describes the data and methods in more detail; section IV provides the results; and section V concludes with policy implications. We find, surprisingly, that the turnover rate of fourth-grade teachers has not increased and has, in fact, decreased relative to teachers in other grades since the implementation of the fourth-grade tests. This decrease in the quit rate is consistent across urban, suburban and rural areas and across schools with differing levels of student performance. In addition, we find little evidence that high-ability teachers are more likely to leave fourth grade and, in fact, in some cases these teachers are less likely to leave. We do find some evidence that more experienced teachers decrease their turnover less than more recent hires, especially in suburban districts. We also find substantial differences in the characteristics of teachers moving into the fourth grade. New fourth-grade teachers are markedly less likely to be first-year teachers than those moving into other elementary school grades. In the lowest performing schools, new fourth-grade teachers are also more likely to have attended highly competitive undergraduate institutions. These results provide evidence that the distribution of teachers is changing as a result of the tests, though not necessarily in the predicted directions.
II. Accountability in New York State
New York has a long history of assessment-based accountability. Since 1878, it has had curriculum based high school exit exams for awarding the Regents high school diploma. In addition, it has employed curriculum based elementary and middle school exams as diagnostic tools for student remediation since the mid 1970s. From 1975 to 1997 these exams were given in 3 rd and 6 th grade math and English language arts. However, the accountability environment has changed substantially in recent years. The Regents adopted learning standards in 1996 that substantially altered high school graduation requirements and which are supported by a new curriculum based assessment system. All students are now held to the same high learning standards and subject to exit exams in five subject areas that are required for a high school 
III. Empirical Approach
This paper uses data on New York State to study the response of teachers to assessment and accountability. The dataset includes information on every teacher that has been a part of the November 5, 2003, p. 27. 6 We also look briefly at whether turnover has increased across all elementary grades since the implementation of the tests, especially in low-performing schools. However this identification comes from changes over time and there are a number of factors including concurrent demographic changes that may affect overall turnover rates and the turnover rates of teachers in low-performing schools. Thus we can not be certain that the changes we see are due to the tests. relative to other grades. However, this result may be due to changes in the composition of teachers in these grades instead of changes in the propensity of similar teachers to leave. Below, we use a multivariate framework to address this possibility. 
Here, the probability that a teacher will leave the grade in the following year, either to teach in another grade or to exit teaching all together, is a function of: the teacher's years of teaching experience (T) as measured by whether or not they are a first-year teacher, teaching experience and the square of teaching experience; the competitive level of their undergraduate institution attended (B) as measured by three dummy variables; whether or not they failed a certification exam (F); the teacher's ethnicity (E); characteristics of the school where they taught (S) 7 The sample size for these last variables is smaller because we need to follow the teacher to the next year to know whether or not he or she left the system or the grade; thus, we don't have data for 1999-2000 on these variables. 1997-1998, 1998-1999, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, G 4 Y post . These final interactions capture the impact of test implementation on teachers' exit decision. The coefficient on the interaction of fourth grade with 1997-1998 assesses whether teachers were more likely to leave just before test implementation, thus avoiding teaching in a testing grade. The coefficient on the interaction of fourth grade with the other years assesses whether teachers were more likely to leave in the year following test implementation.
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We estimate these models separately for two different groupings of schools based on: (1) the geographical setting of the school --urban, suburban, and rural --and (2) the quartile of student achievement based on the students' test scores. In addition, we run a multinomial specification to distinguish teachers who transferred to a different grade within New York State and those teachers who left the system entirely. For illustrative purposes, in these analyses we use an interaction of grade four with a binary variable for being in one of the tested years instead of including a separate interaction for each year.
Next we assess how the leaving behavior of teachers differs for teachers with different characteristics. To do this we interact teacher characteristics with the fourth grade by year interaction. The coefficients on these new interactions measure the differential effect of the test on teachers with different attributes. We characterize the teachers by whether or not they are in their first year teaching in New York State, by whether they have more than ten years of experience, by whether they have a degree from a highly-competitive undergraduate institution, and by whether they have failed a certification exam. For this analysis we add three interaction terms to the original logit model: interactions between the characteristic of interest and dummy
variables representing 1) the tested years, 2) fourth grade, and 3) fourth grade by the tested years.
For attributes with missing data we also include interactions between a missing dummy and the above five measures so that the comparison is between teachers with available data.
In the third portion of the analysis we look to see whether the attributes of teachers entering the fourth grade changed with the introduction of testing. Logit models determine the likelihood that a new teacher has certain attributes, including whether they are first-year teachers, whether they have two to five years of experience, six to nineteen years of experience, twenty or more years of experience, whether they attended a highly competitive undergraduate institution, and whether they failed a core certification exam. We include the school characteristics from 
IV. Results

Has the introduction of high-stakes testing in the fourth grade increased the turnover of fourth-grade teachers?
The results from estimating Equation 1 appear in Table 2 .
In keeping with other studies, we find the probability of leaving higher for first-year teachers, for teachers from more competitive colleges, and for teachers in urban schools and in schools with higher proportions of black, Hispanic and low-performing students (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff, 205; Grissmer and Kirby, 1987; Ingersoll, 2001; Murnane et. al., 1991; Kirby et al., 1999) . Contrary to the hypothesis that testing has led to increased turnover of fourth-grade teachers, however, we again find that the probability of a teacher leaving the fourth grade is lower in the testing years. The coefficient on the interactions between fourth grade and year indicate that teachers were approximately seven percent less likely to leave the fourth grade in the year before implementation and 18 percent less likely to leave after the year of implementation than in previous years and other grades. Similarly, in the next two years, fourthgrade teachers were three and five percent less likely to leave the fourth grade than the model predicts they would have been had the tests not been implemented.
The reduced exit behavior is evident for teachers in urban, suburban, and rural school settings as illustrated in Table 3 . In urban schools fourth-grade teachers were 11 percent less likely to leave; in suburban and rural schools these estimates are eight percent and nine percent respectively. Table 3 also shows the results when split by the quartile of student performance.
Quartile one includes the 25 percent of schools with the lowest proportion of students scoring at the lowest level. Thus, quartile one schools are the highest achieving; and quartile four, the lowest achieving. Again, across all four quartiles teachers are less likely to leave the fourth grade and the effect is the strongest in the lowest achieving schools.
The reduced exit behavior could be driven by fourth-grade teachers who would have quit teaching but instead choose not to quit or by fourth-grade teachers who would have remained in teaching but transferred across grades instead of choosing not to transfer. To distinguish between these types of exit behavior we run a multinomial logit with a three level outcome variable: remaining in the same grade, switching grades but remaining in teaching, and leaving teaching. Table 4 gives these results. The positive effect of testing on teacher retention in the fourth grade is driven primarily reduced transfers from the fourth grade. However, we see some reduction in the decision to quit teaching, as well. Table 5 shows some difference in the impact of test implementation on the probability of leaving across groups of teachers.
Has the introduction of high-stakes testing differentially affected the transfer and exit decisions of teachers with different characteristics?
Teachers just completing their first year of teaching show greater increased retention in the fourth-grade following reform than do more experienced teachers. First-year teachers were 25 percent less likely to leave the fourth grade following reform (zscore=3.89); teachers with two to five years of experience were 14 percent less likely to leave the fourth grade following reform (zscore=3.39); teachers with six to nineteen years of experience were five percent less likely to leave (zscore=1.69); and those with 20 or more years of experience were estimated to be two percent more likely to leave though this estimate is not statistically distinguishable from zero (zscore=0.65).
Teachers that received undergraduate degrees from highly competitive institutions also show greater increased retention in the fourth grade following reform than do their colleagues from less competitive colleges. The odds ratio for the interaction suggest that these teachers are 13 percent less likely to leave as a result of the tests than other teachers.
When urban, suburban and rural schools are assessed separately in Table 5, two trends emerge. First, while in urban and suburban schools, fourth-grade teachers from more competitive colleges are less likely to leave the fourth grade in the year following test implementation than are teachers from less competitive institutions relative to other grades, this trend is less strong in rural schools. Second, the differences across experience groups in retention is driven by teachers in suburban schools. For example, in urban schools excluding teachers with 20 or more years of experience, teachers in the other experience groups are all ten percent less likely to leave the fourth grade following reform. However, in suburban schools, first-year teachers are 44 percent less likely to leave; teachers with two to five years for experience are 15 percent less likely to leave, and those with more experience are unaffected by the reform. When the schools are divided into quartiles of student achievement, we see a similar trend. In high achieving schools more experienced teachers are relatively more likely to leave, while in low achieving schools this is not the case.
Have the characteristics of teachers entering the 4th grade changed with the introduction of testing?
Even though the exit rate of fourth-grade teachers decreased in the years of test implementation, some teachers did exit and new teachers took their place. In addition, a growing student population resulted in more new fourth-grade teachers. We next look at the characteristics of entering teachers and whether those characteristics are different for fourth-grade teachers in the years following the test relative to other years and other grades. Table 6 shows that teachers who are new to the fourth grade are less likely to be first-year teachers and are more likely to have one to four years of experience relative to other grades and pre-testing years. This is true across urban, suburban and rural schools and across student achievement groups. The lowest performing schools are the least likely to put first-year teachers into the fourth grade when a vacancy occurs. New teachers to the fourth grade are also more likely to have graduated from highly competitive undergraduate institutions. Again, this is particularly true for new fourth-grade teachers in the lowest performing schools.
Has the probability of quitting or transferring increased across all elementary school grades as a result of the tests? So far the analysis has compared fourth grade to other elementary grades. However, testing may have influenced quit and transfer behavior across grades. While this is an important question, it is also difficult to answer because the effect of the test cannot be separated from general time trends caused by other factors. Table 2 shows an increased probability of leaving a grade, either by quit or transfer, in the year following the test; but there had also been a general trend toward increased leaving since 1994-95. If teachers are leaving because they worry that their students may not perform well, test-induced leaving may be greater in low-performing schools. Table 7 presents the results of logits estimating the probability that a teacher leaves the schools either to go to another school or to leave the New York State public school system. The interactions between whether the teacher's school is in the lowest quartile of student achievement and the post 1998 dummy measure whether this leaving behavior has increased more in low-performing schools. We find that it has not. Overall and across urban, suburban and rural areas, teachers are no more likely to leave their school following the implementation of testing than they were before. In suburban schools the probability of leaving decreased by nine percent relative to the pre-testing years. Table 7 also gives the interaction of teacher characteristics with the probability of leaving low-performing schools once the tests have been implemented. There are no evident trends based on teacher experience. In urban schools first-year teachers are even less likely than teachers with moderate experience to leave; while in suburban schools the trend goes in the other directions. The clearest trend is for teachers who failed their certification exam. Across the board these teachers are more likely to leave following reform relative to their higher scoring colleagues. While these estimates describe the change in leaving behavior in the years surrounding test implementation, they do not adequately establish a causal link. There are a number of other contemporaneous changes such as demographic shifts that could also alter the overall probability of leaving and the relative probability of leaving low-performing and highperforming schools.
V. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The results provide evidence that the distribution of teachers is changing as a result of the state-mandated testing. New teachers to the fourth grade in the years surrounding the implementation of exams were, on average, less likely to be first-year teachers and more likely to have attended highly competitive undergraduate institutions than new teachers in other grades and in other years. This was especially true in urban schools and in schools that had either very high-or very low-achieving students. This behavior could result from increased resources targeted to the fourth grade to assist with the new pressures of teaching for the exam. Additional analysis of the reallocation of resources other than teachers would help assess whether this is the mechanism for the change in the distribution of teachers.
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In addition, the results of this analysis do not accord with the popularly held belief that teachers are leaving tested grades as result of the implementation of high-stakes testing. In fact, we find exit rates decreased in the fourth grade after state-mandated fourth-grade exams were introduced in the 1998-99 academic year. Fourth-grade turnover decreased across urban, suburban, and rural schools and across schools with different levels of student achievement. The overall decrease in leaving resulted primarily from a decrease in transfers out of the fourth grade for teachers who would have remained in the New York system but also from differential quits.
There are differences in the probability of transferring as a result of the tests across teachers with different characteristics. Teachers in their first-years of teaching reduced their attrition more following testing than did more experienced teachers. We speculate that this differential leaving by more experienced teachers could result from these teachers being less willing to change their teaching styles or curriculum to fit testing requirements. The differential by experience is primarily a suburban phenomenon. There is less difference in the impact of testing by experience levels for teachers in urban or rural schools. Similarly, the exit of more experienced teachers is concentrated in high-achieving schools. The trend is not evident in lowachieving schools. In addition to the differential by experience, we find a differential by the competitiveness of the undergraduate institution that teachers attended. Teachers with degrees from highly competitive colleges reduced their attrition more following reform than did their colleagues with degrees from less competitive colleges.
It is important to emphasize that this paper does not provide evidence that the testing has reduced the overall quit rate of teachers. In fact, turnover appears to increase over the eight years of the study. It is difficult to attribute the cause of this change. Many factors including the labor market in alternative occupations, could affect turnover in schools. Turnover did not increase more in the tested grades and it did not increase more in low-performing schools. The analysis does assess only relatively short-term responses to testing. In the long run, teachers may 11 We looked briefly at class size changes using an OLS regression specification with class size as the dependent variable, school and teacher characteristics as controls, and year dummies, grade dummies, and fourth grade by year interactions as in Equation 1. We found that the class size in the fourth grade was reduced relative to other elementary school grades in 1998-99, the first year of the test. Pressures associated with testing also could change. What the results do suggest is that schools and teachers are responding to testing. Schools are keeping their teachers in the testing grades at a higher rate and replacing the ones that do leave with more experienced, and in some cases, higher-ability teachers. This shows flexibility not always evidenced in public institutions.
However, if resources are reallocated to maximize test performance then other areas may suffer.
A thorough analysis of the impact of testing would need to account for schools' responses to testing and the potential impact of these policies on teaching quality and multi-dimensional student outcomes in both tested and non-tested grades. Note: models include all controls shown in Table 2 12 Comparison Group= Those staying in the grade Note: models include all controls shown in Table 2 plus interactions between each characteristics and (1) grade 4 and post 1998. Note: models include urbanicity, whether the school is in New York City, the percent of black and Hispanic students, the percent of students eligible for free lunch, and the percent of students who scored at the lowest level on the New York State Fourth-grade Mathematics exam and on the English Language Arts Exam;and dummy variables for the year (Y) and the grade (G). (1.83) (3.23) (0.13) Note: Low performing is defined as being in the lowest quartile of student performance on the English Language Arts exam. Controls for all models include percent of black and Hispanic students in school, percent free-lunch students in school, teacher experience, teacher experience squared, first-year teacher, whether the teacher has six to 19 years of experience, whether the teacher has 20 or more years of experience, Barron's rating of undergraduate, whether the teacher failed a certification exam, teacher race/ethnicity, year dummies, and grade dummies. The first two columns also include controls for whether the school is urban, whether the school is suburban and whether the school is in New York City. Controls for all other regressions include all of the above plus interactions between the characteristics presented in the table and low performing school and between the characteristics and post 1998.
